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Abstract
We introduce an agent-based model of interaction, drawing on the con-
tingency approach from Luhmann’s theory of social systems. The agent
interactions are defined by the exchange of distinct messages. Message se-
lection is based on the history of the interaction and developed within the
confines of the problem of double contingency. We examine interaction
strategies in the light of the message-exchange description using analytical
and computational methods.
1 Introduction.
Contingency is a key component of the theory of social systems elaborated by
the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann. The theory describes a vision of so-
ciety as a self-reproducing (autopoietic) system of communicative interaction.
It is based on the work of Talcott Parsons (sociology), Edmund Husserl (phi-
losophy), Heinz von Foerster (cybernetics), Humberto R. Maturana/Francisco
Varela (evolutionary biology), and George Spencer Brown (mathematics). The
first comprehensive elaboration of the theory can be dated to the appearance
of Soziale Systeme (“Social Systems”) in 1984, with an English translation
available in 1995, and found a kind of finalization with the appearance of Die
Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (“The Society’s Society”) in 1997. The most rel-
evant texts for the modeling of learning as a social process can be found in
Social Systems chapter 4, “Communication and Action,” (p.137–175) and in
chapter 8, “Structure and Time” (p.278–356). For readers who are interested in
an exposition of Luhmann’s ideas we recommend for a start Einfu¨hrung in die
Systemtheorie (Luhmann 2004) and the February, 2001 issue of Theory, Culture
1
and Society, particularly the contributions “Niklas Luhmann: An introduction”
by Jakob Arnoldi and “Why systems?” by Dirk Baecker.
The present paper is the first step of a common interdisciplinary work in-
volving a sociologist and theoretical physicists. Our ultimate goal is to design a
multi-agent model using the theoretical background of Luhmann’s theory and
based on a mathematical formalization of a social process in which expectation-
driven communication results in learning. We especially want to explore knowl-
edge diffusion and interactive knowledge generation (innovation) in various so-
cial structures, represented essentially as dynamically evolving graphs. Primar-
ily, we adopt a general point of view of modeling from theoretical physics and
only secondarily intend to have an “as realistic as possible” model. Rather than
putting “everything” in, the focus is to distinguish a few features in Luhmann’s
theory that are relevant for our purposes, and propose a model of expectation-
driven interaction that is a possibly rough first step, but is tractable either on
an analytical or computational level. In particular, it is promising to use an
approach based on dynamical systems theory and statistical mechanics to an-
alyze models of social interactions, and there is some research activity in this
field (Fortunato and Stauffer 2005; Stauffer 2003; Stauffer et al. 2004; Weisbuch
2004; Weisbuch et al. 2005). On the one hand, dynamical systems theory pro-
vides mathematical tools to study the dynamical evolution of interacting agents
at the “microscopic” level (specifically, the detailed evolution of each agent is
considered). On the other, statistical physics allows in principle a description at
the mesoscopic level (groups of agents) and macroscopic level (the population
as a whole).
However, though statistical physics gives accurate description of models in
physics, one must attend to the fact that interactions between human beings
are more complex than interactions usually considered in physics: they are non-
symmetric, nonlinear, involve memory effects, are not explicitly determined by
an energy function, etc. The present paper is an attempt to consider social
mechanisms beyond state-of-the-art modeling.
We introduce a mathematical model portraying interaction as an alternating
exchange of messages by a pair of agents where memories of the past exchanges
are used to build evolving reciprocal expectations. The resulting “interaction
sequence” is quite rich and complex. In fact, the pairwise interactions between
agents depend on various independent parameters, and tuning them can lead to
drastic changes in the model properties. In this work, we give some results in
this direction, based on mathematical as well as computational investigations.
These results are a necessary foundation for handling the intended multi-agent
case.
The present model is a generalization of the work of Peter Dittrich, Thomas
Krohn and Wolfgang Banzhaf (2003). Based on Luhmann’s theory of social
systems, they designed a model which describes the emergence of social order.
We follow them in portraying communicative interaction as an alternating ex-
change of messages by a pair of agents. We use the memory structures they
defined as a starting point for our agents. The memories are the key to the
formalization of the structure of expectation in their model and we take the
same approach. However, we introduce an additional form of memory to allow
individual variation in the expectations of the agents.
The main body of the paper is divided into four sections. First the conceptual
background is elaborated, followed by the mathematical definition of the model.
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Next, the main mathematical and simulation results are discussed. The text
ends with an outlook on planned extensions of the model.
2 Conceptual background.
The concepts from information theory and Luhmann’s social theory which we
use to model expectation-driven interaction are:
1. Information and meaning structure,
2. Interaction, and
3. Double contingency and expectation-expectation.
These concepts will be integrated in a model which explores interaction strate-
gies using different types of interconnected memories. The interconnectedness
of the memories is a precondition for obtaining agents “capable of acting.”
2.1 Information and meaning structure.
The concept of information used in this paper originates with the mathematical
theory of communication of Shannon andWeaver (1949), now known as informa-
tion theory. First, information is defined as being produced when one message
is chosen from a set of messages (Shannon 1948). The minimum requirement of
information production is therefore a set of two messages and a “choice” (usu-
ally, the number of messages is higher, but finite). Second, information sources
are characterized by entropy:
That information be measured by entropy is, after all, natural when
we remember that information, in communication theory, is associ-
ated with the amount of freedom of choice we have in constructing
messages. Thus for a communication source one can say, just as he
would also say it of a thermodynamic ensemble, ‘This situation is
highly organized, it is not characterized by a large degree of random-
ness or of choice—that is to say, the information (or the entropy) is
low.’ (Weaver 1949, pg. 13)
This means that the greater the freedom of choice and consequently the
greater the amount of information, the greater is the uncertainty that a partic-
ular message will be selected. Thus, greater freedom of choice, greater uncer-
tainty and greater information go hand in hand. It is important to note that this
uncertainty-based concept of information must not be confused with meaning.
Although messages usually do have meaning, this is irrelevant to the mathemat-
ical formulation of information on the basis of uncertainty and entropy. Two
messages, one heavily loaded with meaning and the other of pure nonsense, can
have the same amount of information.
The theory of social systems refers to Shannon and Weaver and uses as a
starting point the same definition: information is a selection from a repertoire
of possibilities (Luhmann 1995, pg. 140). But contrary to information theory,
meaning is addressed prominently. It is conceptualized as the durable comple-
ment of the transient information. Meaning is a complex referential structure
which is used by psychic systems (i.e., information sources) to organize the
process of information selection.
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By information we mean an event that selects system states. This
is possible only for structures that delimit and presort possibilities.
Information presupposes structure, yet is not itself a structure, but
rather an event that actualizes the use of structures. . . . Time it-
self, in other words, demands that meaning and information must
be distinguished, although all meaning reproduction occurs via in-
formation (and to this extent can be called information processing),
and all information has meaning. . . . a history of meaning has al-
ready consolidated structures that we treat as self-evident today.
(Luhmann 1995, pg. 67)
According to social systems theory, the historically evolved general meaning
structure is represented on the micro level (i.e., psychic systems, agent level)
in the form of the personal life-world (Luhmann 1995, pg. 70). A personal
meaning-world represents a structurally pre-selected repertoire of possible ref-
erences. Although the repertoire of possibilities is limited, selection is necessary
to produce information. Meaning structure provides a mental map for selection
but does not replace it. All together, the one is not possible without the other—
information production presupposes meaning structure and the actualization of
meaning is done by information production.
The present model considers both information and personal meaning struc-
ture in a simplified manner. Information is treated in the above described math-
ematical form and meaning structures in the form of a second order approach
(pairwise combination). This will be developed in section 3, below.
2.2 Interaction and interaction sequence.
Communicative interaction depends on the availability of information producing
agents. Individuals or other agents are therefore often the elemental unit of soci-
ological communication analysis. Contrary to that, communication units are the
central element of analysis in social system theory and agents are conceptualized
according to their contribution to communication units. Each communication
unit consists of three selections (Luhmann 1995):
1. Information is produced by selection from a structured repertoire of pos-
sibilities by an agent (alter).
2. The agent (alter) must choose a behavior that expresses the produced
information (act of utterance).
3. Another agent (ego) must understand what it means to accept alter’s
selection.
Information production includes therefore that alter not only views itself
as part of a general meaning world but assumes also that the same is true for
ego. In other words, alter and ego act on the assumption that each life-world
is part of the same general meaning world in which information can be true
or false, can be uttered, and can be understood. This assumption of shared
meaning structures allows alter to generate an expectation of success, i.e., the
expectation that the selection will be accepted by ego.
By ‘success’ I mean that the recipient of the communication ac-
cepts the selective content of the communication (the information)
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as a premise of his own behavior, thus joining further selections to
the primary selection and reinforcing its selectivity in the process.
(Luhmann 1990, pg. 88)
An interaction system is constituted by one communication unit following
another. The closure of an interaction system is given by two constituents
(Luhmann 1990, pg. 5ff): participants must be present and communication
units can only be understood in the context of the system. Consequently, at
least a minimum extent of understanding is necessary for the generation of an
interaction system. If one communication unit directly follows another, it is a
positive test that the preceding communication unit was understood sufficiently.
Every communication unit is therefore recursively secured in possibilities of
understanding and the control of understanding in the connective context.
In the present model, the term “message” is used to describe the three parts
of the communication unit. From this follows that the model is at its core a
message exchange model (ME model) and starts with a list of messages. The
three-part unity is now:
1. Alter selects a message.
2. Once the selection process is finalized, the message is sent.
3. Ego receives the sent message.
Within the present version of the ME model, agents do not have the option
to reject a message or to refuse to answer. Their “freedom” is incorporated in
the process of message selection. Agents can be distinguished by the number
of messages they are able to use and by their selection strategies. The ongo-
ing exchange of messages creates an interaction sequence with a limited—but
possibly high—number of steps.
Overall, the term “interaction” is considerably simplified in comparison to
the full Luhmannian notion. Additionally, the notion of interaction system is
not used in the present version of the model, because “understanding” is not
considered.
2.3 Double contingency and expectation-expectation.
In social system theory, the dynamics of an interaction sequence are explained
by contingency and expectation1. First, contingency arises because agents are
complex systems that are “black boxes” for each other. An agent will never
know exactly what the other will do next. The reciprocity of social situations
(two agents: alter and ego) results in double contingency: alter contingency and
ego contingency.
Second, the black-box problem is solved by expectations. Agents create
expectations about the future actions of the other agents to adjust their own
actions. For example, two business partners meeting antemeridian expect from
each other that the adequate greeting is good morning (and not good evening,
etc.). This is a situation with high expectational security. If the two had
a conflict last time they met, the expectational security may decrease (will
1Expectations in social systems theory are different from expectations in probability or
statistics; the meaning is closer to the statistical notion of conditional expectation. In this
work, we use the term in the social systems sense.
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the other answer my greeting?). The example illustrates that expectations are
condensed forms of meaning structures (Luhmann 1995, pp. 96, 402). Based on
the societally given and biographically determined structures of expectations,
alter and ego have situation-specific reciprocal expectations.
In social systems, expectations are the temporal form in which struc-
tures develop. But as structures of social systems expectations ac-
quire social relevance and thus suitability only if, on their part, they
can be anticipated. Only in this way can situations with double
contingency be ordered. Expectations must become reflexive: it
must be able to relate to itself, not only in the sense of a diffuse
accompanying consciousness but so that it knows it is anticipated as
anticipating. This is how expectation can order a social field that
includes more than one participant. Ego must be able to anticipate
what alter anticipates of him to make his own anticipations and be-
havior agree with alter’s anticipation. (Luhmann 1995,
pg. 303)
The duplication of contingency causes the duplication of expectation:
• Alter has expectations vis-a`-vis ego.
• Ego knows that alter expects something from him/her, but can never know
what exactly the expectation is.
• Therefore, ego builds expectations about “alter’s expectations of ego,”
that is, expectation-expectation.
In complex societies, expectational security is difficult. Therefore, it is nec-
essary to have stabilizing factors. One way to establish expectations that are
relatively stabilized over time is through relation to something which is not itself
an event but has duration. Examples of well-known expectational nexuses in
sociology are persons and roles. Persons are societally constituted for the sake of
ordering of behavioral expectations. Roles serve—compared with persons—as
a more abstract perspective for the identification of expectations.
Within the ME model in its present form, the agents are the relevant expec-
tational nexuses.
2.4 Memories and memory development.
The agents are equipped with three different types of memories: initially, their
behavior tends towards a general long-term memory which represents a given
scope of interaction. That is, they are able to use a certain number of mes-
sages in interaction sequences. The ability to use messages is determined by
the above mentioned pairwise combination. The model agents start with a ran-
domly or otherwise specified stimulus-response matrix (response disposition, see
section 3.3.1).
Since memory development depends on expectation driven interaction, agents
are equipped with specific memories allowing them to construct expectations.
This is done by the introduction of specific ego- and alter-memories (follow-
ing Dittrich et al. 2003). The ego memory represents an agent’s expectation
towards itself and the alter memory an agent’s expectation-expectation (i.e.,
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expectations of agent B about the expectations of agent A vis-a`-vis agent B).
The model starts with pristine ego- and alter- memories which will be updated
with every interaction. The links between the long-term memory and ego- and
alter-memory will be explained in section 3.
2.5 Interaction strategies.
Within the presented model, interaction strategies are selection strategies. All
three memories are used in each information-production activity (i.e., selection
from the pairwise structured repertoire of possibilities in the form of stimulus-
response matrices). The way the memories are used defines the interaction
strategy. Agents can be specified to follow various strategies, e.g., “conser-
vative” agents maximize towards predictability, “innovative” agents towards
unpredictability.
Interaction strategies are formalized in section 3.3.2. The strategies re-
sult from balancing out conflicting behavioral intentions for agent interactions.
Specifically: (1) ego-oriented behavior, maintaining individual behavior patterns
disregarding the interaction partner; (2) interaction-oriented behavior, providing
stable responses for the interaction partner through consistent and comprehensi-
ble behavior; (3) uncertainty-oriented behavior, seeking or avoiding unexpected
responses from the interaction partner; and (4) risk-oriented behavior, handling
novel or erroneous responses. We investigate the effect of various strategies
using analytical (section 4.1) and computational (section 4.2) methods.
In this work, we focus on how strategies affect interaction; we will not present
rules for choosing strategies. However, it is clear that the choice of a strategy is a
way for agents to cope with the problem of appropriate behavior in a situational
context. A desirable—and challenging—extension of the presented model would
be to develop rules for choosing and evaluating strategies.
3 Model definition.
3.1 Messages.
In the model, the fundamental elements of agent interactions are messages.
The number of messages is assumed to be finite. We do not concern ourselves
here with giving a real-world interpretation to the messages, and instead simply
number them from 1 to the number of messages nS .
Messages are transmitted through a multi-step process. A message is first se-
lected, then sent and simultaneously received by the interaction partner. We do
not consider the medium in which the message is sent. Following Dittrich et al.
(2003), we assume that messages are distinct from one another. This assump-
tion provides a significant simplification over, e.g., natural languages, ignoring
issues such as ambiguity or transmission errors.
It can be convenient to recognize that messages transmitted by an agent
are formally equivalent to states of the agent. A construction by Dittrich et al.
(2003) illustrates this in a readily accessible fashion: each agent has a number of
signs available, and communicates a message by holding up the appropriate sign.
Thus, selecting a new message to transmit is equivalent to a state transition—
the agent holding up a new sign.
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3.2 Interaction sequences.
Agents take turns sending messages to each other. In doing so, they record
the foregoing sequence of messages, and must select the next message in the
sequence.
We anticipate that the message selected will depend most strongly on the
most recent messages in the sequence, while the exact ordering of earlier mes-
sages is of lesser or negligible importance. This suggests that a reasonable
approximation of the selection process is to consider only a finite number of pre-
ceding messages, rather than the complete sequence. Thus, the agents should
select the message based on the statistics of subsequences of various lengths.
Earlier portions of the message sequence are used to define the agents and the
rules by which they select messages (see section 3.3).
The length of the subsequences in such approximations define the order
of the approximation. A zeroth-order approximation considers only message
identity, ignoring how the messages actually appear in sequences. A first-order
approximation considers message sequences of length one, showing the relative
frequency with which the messages appear in sequences. Second- and higher-
order approximations consider runs of messages, showing correlations between
messages in the sequences.
In this paper, we focus exclusively on a second-order approximation, dealing
with pairs of messages. A second-order approximation is the simplest case in
which relationships between messages become important, and can be usefully
interpreted as dealing with stimuli and responses. However, it is vitally impor-
tant to recognize that each message is simultaneously used as both stimulus and
response.
In this work, we adopt the point of view that all agent interactions are ex-
pressed and interpreted in terms of message sequences. Consequently, we assess
interactions in terms of message sequences as well. An example of how to do
this is to identify a specific agent’s behavior as authoritative, effectively defin-
ing a utility function; the student-teacher situation described in section 4.2.4
is analyzed in this way. Interaction of a single agent with its environment can
be treated in the same fashion by describing the environment itself as a second
agent and the interaction as messages.
3.3 Agents.
In this section, we formally define the agents. Essentially, an agent maintains
a number of memories that describe statistics of message sequences in which it
has taken part, and has a rule for using those memories to select a response
message to a stimulus message. The agents are a generalization of the agents
used by Dittrich et al. (2003); see section 3.3.2.
Although we focus in this work on interactions between pairs of agents, the
agent definitions are posed in a manner that can be generalized to communities
of agents. See section 5.2 for discussion of how the model could be extended to
handle groups of agents.
3.3.1 Memories.
Agent memories fall broadly into two classes: (1) memories of the details of
particular interaction sequences between one agent (alter) and another agent
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(ego) and (2) long-term memories reflecting the general disposition of a single
agent. All of the memories are represented as probability distributions over
stimuli and responses.
We use three different forms of probabilities in the definition and application
of the agent memories. For example, consider the ego memory (defined fully
below). We denote by E
(t)
AB (r, s) the joint probability that agent A maintains
at time t, estimating the likelihood that agent B will transmit a message s to
which agent A will respond with a message r. Second, we use the conditional
probability E
(t)
A|B (r | s), showing the likelihood of agent A responding with mes-
sage r given that agent B has already transmitted message s. Finally, we use the
marginal probability E
(t)
A (r), showing the likelihood of agent A responding with
message r regardless of what message agent B sends. These three probabilities
are related by
E
(t)
A (r) =
∑
s
E
(t)
AB (r, s) (1)
E
(t)
A|B (r | s) =
E
(t)
AB (r, s)∑
r E
(t)
AB (r, s)
. (2)
We use similar notation for all the memories (and other probabilities) in this
work.
The memories of messages exchanged are patterned after those used by
Dittrich et al. (2003). They take two complementary forms, the ego memory
and the alter memory, reflecting the roles of the agents as both sender and
receiver.
The ego memory E
(t)
AB (r, s) is a time-dependent memory that agent A main-
tains about interactions with agent B, where agent B provides the stimulus s to
which agent A gives response r. During the course of interaction with agent B,
the corresponding ego memory is continuously updated based on the notion that
the ego memory derives from the relative frequency of stimulus-response pairs.
In general, an agent will have a distinct ego memory for each of the other agents.
Before agents A and B have interacted, agent A’s ego memory E
(t)
AB (r, s) (as
well as agent B’s counterpart E
(t)
BA (r, s)) is undefined. As agents A and B inter-
act through time t, they together produce a message sequencem1,m2, . . . ,mt−1,mt.
Assuming that agent B has sent the first message, one view of the sequence is
that agentB has provided a sequence of stimulim1,m3, . . . ,mt−3,mt−1 to which
agent A has provided a corresponding set of responses m2,m4, . . . ,mt−2,mt. If
agent A began the communication, the first message could be dropped from the
communication sequence; similarly, if agent B provided the final message, this
“unanswered stimulus” could be dropped from the communication sequence.
With this view of stimuli and responses, the ego memory for agent A is
defined by
E
(t)
AB (r, s) =
2
t
t−1∑
i=1,3,5,...
δsmiδ
r
mi+1
, (3)
for all r and s. In Eq. (3), we assume that the memory has an infinite capacity,
able to exactly treat any number of stimulus-response pairs. A natural and
desirable modification is to consider memories with a finite capacity.
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Limited memory could be incorporated in a variety of ways. The approach
we take is to introduce a “forgetting” parameter λ
(E)
A , with a value from the
interval [0, 1], such that the ego memory is calculated as
E
(t)
AB (r, s) = 2
1− λ
(E)
A
1− (λ
(E)
A )
t
t∑
i=1,3,5,...
(λ
(E)
A )
t−i−1δrmi+1δ
s
mi
(4)
for all r and s. The memory of a particular message transmission decays expo-
nentially.
The alter memory A
(t)
AB (r, s) is analogous to the ego memory, but with the
roles of sender and receiver reversed. Thus, A
(t)
AB (r, s) is the memory that
agent A maintains about message exchanges with agent B, where agent A pro-
vides the stimulus s to which agent B gives response r. The procedure for
calculating the alter memory directly parallels that for the ego memory, except
that the messages sent by agent A are now identified as the stimuli and the
messages sent by agent B are now identified as the responses. The calculation
otherwise proceeds as before, including making use of a forgetting parameter
λ
(A)
A for the alter memory.
A useful symmetry often exists between the ego and alter memories of the
agents. Using the alter memory A
(t)
AB (r, s), agent A tracks the responses of
agent B to stimuli from agent A. This is exactly what agent B tracks in its ego
memory E
(t)
BA (r, s). Thus, the memories of the two agents are related by
A
(t)
AB (r, s) = E
(t)
BA (r, s) . (5)
However, Eq. (5) holds only if the agent memories are both infinite or λ
(A)
A =
λ
(E)
B . The corresponding relation A
(t)
BA (r, s) = E
(t)
AB (r, s) holds as well when the
memories are both infinite or λ
(E)
A = λ
(A)
B .
Besides the ego and alter memories, an agent has another memory called the
response disposition. The response disposition QA of agent A is, like the ego and
alter memories, represented as a joint distribution, but there are many marked
differences. Significantly, the response disposition is not associated with another
particular agent, but instead shows what the agent brings to all interactions. In
particular, the response disposition can act like a general data bank applicable
to any other agent. Further, the response disposition changes more slowly.
Instead, the update occurs after the interaction sequences. In this work, we
hold the response dispositions fixed, so we defer discussion of a possible update
rule for the response disposition to section 5.1.
3.3.2 Transition probability.
The memories of an agent are combined to produce a transition probability,
which is, in turn, used to randomly select messages. The form of the transition
probability is a generalization of that used by Dittrich et al. (2003). Differences
arise from the differing goals of the two models: Dittrich et al. consider the
formation of social order, while we are interested in strategies of interaction.
The transition probability is constructed so as to deal with several distinct is-
sues. Because of this, we do not develop the transition probability as an optimal
selection rule according to one criterion, but rather as a compromise between
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several conflicting factors arising in a situation of double contingency. We con-
sider three such factors: (1) agent preference, (2) satisfaction of expectations,
and (3) treatment of individual uncertainty.
The first factor that we consider is agent preference. An agent tries to select
messages that are correct for the situation, based on its prior experiences. The
response disposition matches well with this notion, since, as discussed above, it
is a relatively stable memory of the general agent behavior.
The second factor that we consider is that an agent tries to satisfy the
expectations that its interaction partner has about the agent itself. This is the
expectation-expectation. Consider interactions between agents A and B. While
selecting which message to send, agent A estimates what message agent B would
expect to receive from agent A. In terms of the memories of agent A, this is
expressed as the ego memory E
(t)
AB (r, s). Thus, what responses agent A has
given to agent B in the past will be favored in the future, so that there is a
continual pressure for an agent to be consistent in its responses.
The third factor we consider is that an agent takes into account the level of
certainty of the expected response from its interaction partner. By favoring mes-
sages that lead to unpredictable responses, the agent can pursue “interesting,”
interactions of greater complexity. Alternatively, the agent may favor messages
that lead to predictable responses, pursuing simpler (and more comprehensible)
interactions.
A natural approach is for agent A to calculate, based on previous responses
of agent B, the uncertainty for each possible message r that it could send. This
corresponds to calculating the entropy based on the conditional alter memory
A
(t)
A|B (r
′ | r), yielding
H
[
A
(t)
A|B (· | r)
]
= −
∑
r′
A
(t)
A|B (r
′ | r) lognS A
(t)
A|B (r
′ | r) . (6)
The base of the logarithm is traditionally taken as 2, measuring the entropy
in bits, but in this work we take the base to be nS , the number of different
messages. With this choice, the entropy take on values from the interval [0, 1],
regardless of the number of messages.
The uncertaintyH
[
A
(t)
A|B (· | r)
]
is closely related to the expectation-certainty
from Dittrich et al. (2003). Note that all possible messages r are considered,
so that agent A may send a message to agent B that is highly unlikely based
on a just-received stimulus. Thus, we expect that resolving uncertainty and
satisfying expectations will come into conflict.
The transition probability is assembled from the foregoing components into
a conditional probability distribution with form
U
(t)
A|B (r | s) ∝ c
(A)
1 QA (r | s)+c
(A)
2 E
(t)
A|B (r | s)+c
(A)
3 H
[
A
(t)
A|B (· | r)
]
+c
(A)
4
1
nS
.
(7)
The parameters c
(A)
1 , c
(A)
2 , and c
(A)
3 reflect the relative importance of the three
factors discussed above, while c
(A)
4 is an offset that provides a randomizing
element. The randomizing element provides a mechanism for, e.g., introducing
novel messages or transitions. It also plays an important role on mathematical
grounds (see the appendix).
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Note that we allow the parameter c
(A)
3 to be negative. A positive c
(A)
3 corre-
sponds to agent A favoring messages that lead to unpredictable responses, while
a negative c
(A)
3 corresponds to agent A “inhibiting” messages that lead to un-
predictable response, hence favoring messages leading to predictable responses.
When c
(A)
3 is negative, Eq. (7) could become negative. Since U
(t)
A|B (r | s) is a
probability, we deal with this negative-value case by setting it to zero whenever
Eq. (7) gives a negative value.
Clearly, one may expect different results in the outcome of interactions when
c
(A)
3 is changed from a positive to a negative value. This is illustrated mathemat-
ically in the appendix and numerically in section 4.2. We do, in fact, observe a
sharp transition in the entropy of the alter and ego memories of the agent (mea-
suring the average uncertainty in their response) near c
(A)
3 = 0. Note however
that the transition depends also on the other parameters and does not necessar-
ily occur exactly at c
(A)
3 = 0. This is discussed in the appendix. The transition
is reminiscent of what Dittrich et al. call the appearance of social order, though
our model is different, especially because of the response disposition which plays
a crucial role in the transition.
Appropriate choice of the coefficients c
(A)
1 , c
(A)
2 , c
(A)
3 , and c
(A)
4 allows the
transition probabilities used by Dittrich et al. to be constructed as a special
case of Eq. (7). In particular, their parameters α, cf , and N are related to the
ones used here by
c
(A)
1 = 0 (8)
c
(A)
2 = 1− α (9)
c
(A)
3 = −α (10)
c
(A)
4 = nS
(
α+
cf
N
)
. (11)
Note finally that the transition probability given in Eq. (7) is not appropri-
ate for selecting the initial message of an interaction sequence. However, the
response disposition provides a useful mechanism for selection of the initial mes-
sage. We calculate a marginal probability for the response r from the response
disposition QA (r, s), using
QA (r) =
∑
s
QA (r, s) . (12)
With the marginal probability of initial messages QA (r) and the conditional
probability for responses U
(t)
A|B (r | s), stochastic simulations of the model system
are relatively straightforward to implement programmatically.
4 Results.
4.1 Summary of mathematical results.
In this section we briefly summarize the mathematical results obtained in the
paper. A detailed description of the mathematical setting is given in the ap-
pendix. Supporting numerical results are presented in section 4.2.
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The model evolution is a stochastic process where the probability for an
agent to select a message is given by a transition matrix, as in a Markov pro-
cess. However, the transition matrix is history-dependent and the corresponding
process is not Markovian. The general mathematical framework for this type of
process is called “chains with complete connections.” (Maillard 2003) A brief
overview is given in the appendix.
On mathematical grounds, a precise description of the pairwise interaction
between agents requires answering at least the following questions:
1. Does the evolution asymptotically lead to a stationary regime ?
2. What is the convergence rate and what is the nature of the transients?
3. How can we quantitatively characterize the asymptotic regime?
We address these briefly below. Many other questions are, of course, possible.
Does the evolution asymptotically lead to a stationary regime? In the model,
convergence to a stationary state means that, after having exchanged sufficiently
many symbols, the “perceptions”that each agent has of the other’s behavior
(alter memory) and of its own behavior (ego memory) have stabilized and do
not evolve any further. The probability that agent A provides a given symbol as
a response to some stimulus from agent B is not changed by further exchanges.
Mathematically, the convergence to a stationary state is not straightfor-
ward. One cannot a priori exclude non-convergent regimes, such as cycles,
quasi-periodic behavior, chaotic or intermittent evolution, etc.. A cyclic evo-
lution, for example, could correspond to a cyclothymic agent whose reactions
vary periodically in time. More complex regimes would essentially correspond to
agents whose reactions evolves in an unpredictable way. Though such behaviors
are certainly interesting from a psychological point of view, they are not desir-
able in a model intended to describe knowledge diffusion in a network of agents
assumed to be relatively “stable.” It is therefore desirable to identify conditions
that ensure the convergence to a stationary state. These conditions are dis-
cussed in the appendix. We also establish explicit equations for the memories
in the stationary state.
What is the convergence rate and what is the nature of the transients? The
answer to this question is as important as the previous one. Indeed, the investi-
gated asymptotic behavior is based on the limit where interaction sequences are
infinitely long, while in real situations they are obviously finite. However, if the
characteristic time necessary for an agent to stabilize its behavior is significantly
shorter than the typical duration of an interaction, one may consider that the
asymptotic regime is reached and the corresponding results essentially apply. In
the opposite case, the behavior is not stabilized and important changes in the
stimulus-response probabilities may still occur. This transient regime is more
difficult to handle and we have focused on the first case. The characteristic time
for the transients depends on the parameters c1 through c4.
How can we quantitatively characterize the asymptotic regime? Addressing
this question basically requires identifying a set of relevant observables—that
is, a set of functions assigning to the current state of the two-agent system a
number that corresponds to a rating of the interaction. We have obtained some
mathematical and numerical results about the variations of the observables when
the coefficients in Eq. (7) are changed. The most salient feature is the existence
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of a sharp transition when c3 changes its sign. Simulations demonstrating the
transition are presented in section 4.2.3.
We have chosen several observables. The entropy of a memory measures the
uncertainty or unpredictability of the stimulus-response relationship. A mem-
ory with high entropy is representative of complex (and, presumably, hard to
understand) interaction sequences. We inspect the entropy of both the ego and
alter memories. The distance or overlap between two memories measures how
close are their representations of the stimulus-response relationship. Particu-
larly interesting is the distance between the response disposition of an agent A
and the alter memory another agent B maintains about agent A, which shows
the discrepancy between the actual behavior of agent A and agent B’s expecta-
tion of that behavior. Note that this representation is necessarily biased since
agent B selects the stimuli it uses to acquire its knowledge about agent A. This
induces a bias (see appendix for a mathematical formulation of this).
To recap, in the appendix we provide a mathematical setting where we dis-
cuss the convergence of the dynamics to a state where memories are stabilized.
We obtain explicit equations for the asymptotic state and discuss how the so-
lutions depend on the model parameters. In particular, we show that a drastic
change occurs when c3 is near zero. We assign to the asymptotic state a set
of observables measuring the quality of the interaction according to different
criteria.
4.2 Simulation results.
4.2.1 Types of agents.
A broad variety of agents can be realized from the definitions in section 3.3.
The value used for the response disposition reflects an individualized aspect
of an agent’s behavior, while the various other parameters allow a wide range
of strategies for interaction. In Eq. (50), we give an analytic expression for
the memories in the asymptotic regime. However, an extensive study of the
solutions of this equation, depending on six independent parameters, is beyond
the scope of this paper. Instead, we focus in this section on a few situations
with different types of agents, as characterized by their response dispositions.
One type of agent has a random response disposition matrix, created by se-
lecting each element uniformly from the interval [0, 1] and normalizing the total
probability. With random response dispositions of this sort, the contribution
to the agent behavior is complex but unique to each agent. A second type of
agent has its behavior restricted to a subset of the possibilities, never producing
certain messages. A response disposition for this type of agent, when presented
as a matrix, can be expressed as a block structure, such as in Fig. 1. A third and
final type of agent response disposition that we consider has a banded structure,
as in Fig. 7, allowing the agent to transmit any message, but with restricted
transitions between them.
The parameters c
(A)
1 , c
(A)
2 , c
(A)
3 , and c
(A)
4 also play important roles in the
behavior of an agent A. We impose a constraint with the form
c
(A)
1 + c
(A)
2 + c
(A)
3 + c
(A)
4 = 1 . (13)
The constraint is in no way fundamental, but is useful for graphical presentation
of simulation results.
14
4.2.2 Complementary knowledge.
As an initial simulation, we consider interactions between two agents with block-
structured response dispositions, as shown in Fig. 1. The number of messages
is nS = 11. The elements of the probability matrices are shown as circles whose
sizes are proportional to the value of the matrix elements, with the sum of the
values equal to one.
The situation shown in Fig. 1 corresponds to a case of “complementary
knowledge,” where the agent behaviors are associated with distinct subdomains
of the larger context. Each response disposition matrix has a 7× 7 block where
the elements have uniform values of 1/49, while all other elements are zero.
The blocks for the two agents have a non-zero overlap. The subdomain for
agent A deals with messages 1 through 7, while that for agent B deals with
messages 5 through 11. Thus, if agent B provides a stimulus from {5, 6, 7},
agent A responds with a message from {1, 2, . . . , 7} with equiprobability. The
coefficients c
(A)
4 and c
(B)
4 are both set to 0.01. These terms are useful to handle
the response of the agent when the stimulus is “unknown” (i.e., it is not in the
appropriate block). In such a case, the agent responds to any stimulus message
with equal likelihood.
Interaction between the two agents consists of a large number of short in-
teraction sequences. We study the evolution of the alter and ego memories of
each agent as the number of completed interaction sequences increases. Each
interaction sequence consists of the exchange of 11 messages between the two
agents, with the agents taking part in 128000 successive interaction sequences.
For each interaction sequence, one of the two agents is chosen to select the initial
message at random, independently of how previous sequences were begun (ran-
domly choosing this “starting agent” is intended to avoid pathological behavior
leading to non-generic sequences).
We first checked the convergence of E
(t)
A (r) to the first mode of U
(t)
A|BU
(t)
B|A
(see section A.5). We measure the distance between these two vectors at the end
of the simulation. The distance tends to zero when the number of interaction
sequences T increases, but it decreases slowly, like 1/T (as expected from the
central limit theorem). An example is presented in Fig. 2 for c
(A)
1 = c
(B)
1 = 0.99
and c
(A)
2 = c
(B)
2 = c
(A)
3 = c
(B)
3 = 0.
We next investigated four extremal cases (c
(X)
1 = 0.99; c
(X)
2 = 0; c
(X)
3 =
0; c
(X)
4 = 0.01), (c
(X)
1 = 0; c
(X)
2 = 0.99; c
(X)
3 = 0; c
(X)
4 = 0.01), (c
(X)
1 = 0; c
(X)
2 =
0; c
(X)
3 = 0.99; c
(X)
4 = 0.01), and (c
(X)
1 = 0.99; c
(X)
2 = 0.99; c
(X)
3 = −0.99; c
(X)
4 =
0.01). For each case, we first examined the convergence to the asymptotic
regime. We show the evolution of the joint entropy in Fig. 3. This allows us to
estimate the time needed to reach the asymptotic regime.
Next, we plotted the asymptotic values of the ego and alter memory of
agent A, averaged over several samples. They are shown in Fig. 4 for λ(A) =
λ(E) = 1. In Fig. 5, we show the values with a finite memory (λ(A) = λ(E) = 0.99,
corresponding to a characteristic time scale of approximately 100 steps). Our
main observations are:
1. c
(X)
1 = 0.99; c
(X)
2 = 0; c
(X)
3 = 0; c
(X)
4 = 0.01. The responses of each agent
are essentially determined by its response disposition. The asymptotic
behavior is given by P
(∞)
AB and P
(∞)
BA , the first modes of the matricesQAQB
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andQBQA, respectively. Fig. 2 shows indeed the convergence to this state.
The asymptotic values of the alter and ego memories are given by QAP
(∞)
BA
and QBP
(∞)
AB The memory matrices have a “blockwise” structure with a
block of maximal probability corresponding to the stimuli known by both
agents.
2. c
(X)
1 = 0; c
(X)
2 = 0.99; c
(X)
3 = 0; c
(X)
4 = 0.01. The response of each agent
is essentially determined by its ego memory. As expected, the maximal
variance is observed for this case. Indeed, there are long transient corre-
sponding to metastable states and there are many such states.
3. c
(X)
1 = 0; c
(X)
2 = 0; c
(X)
3 = 0.99; c
(X)
4 = 0.01. The response of each agent is
essentially determined by its alter memory, and the probability is higher
for selecting messages that induce responses with high uncertainty. Again,
the asymptotic state is the state of maximal entropy.
4. c
(X)
1 = 0.99; c
(X)
2 = 0.99; c
(X)
3 = −0.99; c
(X)
4 = 0.01. The response of each
agent is essentially determined by its alter memory, but the probability is
lower for selecting messages that induce responses with high uncertainty.
The asymptotic memories have an interesting structure. The alter and
ego memories have block structures like that of both agents’ response
dispositions, but translated in the set of messages exchanged (contrast
Fig. 1 and the bottom row of Fig. 5). The effect is clear if we keep in
mind that, for agent A’s ego memory, the stimulus is always given by
agent B, while for agent A’s alter memory, the stimulus is always given
by agent A.
Finally, we note that, in this example, the asymptotic alter memory does
not become identical to the other agent’s response disposition. Indeed, the
perception that agent A has from agent B is biased by the fact that she chooses
always the stimuli according to her own preferences (described in the appendix
in more mathematical terms). A prominent illustration of this is given in Fig. 5
(bottom row).
These simulations shows how the final (asymptotic) outcome of the interac-
tion may differ when the parameters ci are set to different, extremal values. The
role of the forgetting parameter is also important. In some sense, the asymptotic
matrices whose structure are the closest to the block structure of the response
dispositions are the matrices in the bottom row of Fig. 5, where the agent are
able to “forget.” There is a higher contrast between the blocks seen in the
corresponding row of Fig. 4 when λ(A) = λ(E) = 1.
4.2.3 Behavior dependence on the parameters c1, c2, c3, c4.
Based on theoretical (section A.4) and numerical (section 4.2.2) considerations,
one expects changes in the asymptotic regime as the parameters c
(A)
i and c
(B)
i
vary. Note, however, that the general situation where agents A and B have
different coefficients requires investigations in an 8 dimensional space. Even if
we impose constraints of the form in Eq. (13), this only reduces the parameter
space to 6 dimensions. A full investigation of the space of parameters is therefore
beyond the scope of this paper and will be done in a separate work. To produce
a manageable parameter space, we focus here on the situation where agents A
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and B have identical coefficients and where c4 is fixed to a small value (0.01).
The number of messages exchanged by the agents is nS = 11.
To explore the reduced, c1c2 space, we simulate interaction with response
dispositions of both agents selected randomly (see section 4.2.1 for details). We
conduct 10000 successive interaction sequences of length 11 for each pair of
agents. In each sequence, the agent that transmit the first message is selected
at random. Therefore we have a total exchange of 110000 messages.
We compute the asymptotic value of the joint entropy of the memories. We
average the entropy over 100 realizations of the response dispositions. This
allows us to present, e.g., the entropy of the alter memory as a function of c1
and c2.
In Fig. 6, we show the joint entropy of the alter memory (the joint entropy of
the ego memory is similar). The parameters c1 and c2 both vary in the interval
[0, 0.99]. Consequently, c3 ∈ [−0.99 : 0.99]. There is an abrupt change in the
entropy close to the line c1 + c2 = 0.01 (c3 = 0). The transition does not occur
exactly at said line, but depends on c1 and c2.
The surface in Fig. 6 shows a drastic change in the unpredictability of the
pairs, and thus in the complexity of interactions, when crossing a critical line
in the c1c2 parameter space. Note, however, that the transition is not precisely
at c3 = 0, but rather to a more complex line as discussed in the appendix.
4.2.4 Rates of change.
While the asymptotically stable states of the memories are useful in understand-
ing interaction, they are not the only important factors. Additionally, the rates
at which the memories change can be important. In particular, an inferior result
quickly obtained may be more desirable than a superior result reached later.
To investigate rates, we simulate two distinct types of agents exchanging
nS = 5 messages. The first type of agent is a “teacher” agent A that has
relatively simple behavior. Its response disposition has a banded structure,
shown in Fig. 7. The teacher agent has a fixed behavior dependent only upon
its response disposition (c
(A)
2 = c
(A)
3 = c
(A)
4 = 0). The values of λ
(A)
A and λ
(E)
A
are irrelevant, since the alter and ego memories contribute nothing.
The second type is a “student” agent B that has more general behavior. The
student agent has a random response disposition, as described in section 4.2.1.
In general, the student agent uses all of its memories to determine the transition
probability, and we vary the values of c
(B)
1 , c
(B)
2 , c
(B)
3 , and c
(B)
4 to investigate
the effects of the various parameters. We take the memories to be infinite,
λ
(A)
B = λ
(E)
B = 1.
To assess the simulations, we focus on how rapidly the student agent is able
to capture the behavior of the teacher agent in its memories. It is natural
to determine this using the difference between the response disposition of the
teacher agent and the alter memory of the student agent. We measure the
difference using the distance d
(
QA,A
(t)
BA
)
, defined by
d2
(
QA,A
(t)
BA
)
=
1
2
∑
r,s
(
QA (r, s)−A
(t)
BA (r, s)
)2
. (14)
The value of d
(
QA,A
(t)
BA
)
always lies in the interval [0, 1].
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The distance defined by Eq. (14) requires memories from both agents, and
thus cannot actually be calculated by either agent. However, by using the
identity given by Eq. (5), we see that d2
(
QA,A
(t)
BA
)
= d2
(
QA, E
(t)
AB
)
, which
depends only on memories of agent A and is therefore in principle available
to agent A. This reveals an interesting asymmetry in the system; the teacher
agent A has an ability to assess the interaction that the student agent B lacks.
A simple way to determine a rate of change from the memories is to base
it on the number of message exchanges it takes for the distance to first become
smaller than some target distance. If N messages are exchanged before the
target distance is reached, the rate is simply 1/N . The simulated interaction
can be limited to a finite number of exchanges with the rate set to zero if the
target is not reached during the simulation.
In Fig. 8, we show the rates for different distances, averaged over 50 samples.
In Fig. 8(a), the rate determined from a target distance of 0.1 is shown. For this
case, the rates have a simple structure, generally proceeding more rapidly with
c
(B)
3 < 0. In contrast, Fig. 8(b) presents quite different results based on a target
distance of 0.05, with more complex structure to the rates. In this latter case,
the highest rates occur with c
(B)
3 > 0. We note that inclusion of the response
disposition is crucial in this scenario. In particular, the rate of change goes to
zero if the student agent suppresses its response disposition.
5 Outlook.
5.1 Assessment of interactions.
In section 3.3.1, we presented rules for updating the ego and alter memories of an
agent. These memories are updated during the course of interactions in which
the agent is involved. In contrast, the response disposition is held fixed during
interaction. In this section, we present a scheme for update of the response
disposition, occurring intermittently at the end of interaction sequences.2
Thus far, the response disposition QA (r, s) has been presented as time in-
dependent. To generalize this, we number the interaction sequences and add
an index to the response disposition to indicate the sequence number, giving
Q
(T )
A (r, s).
Not all interactions are successful. For a two-party interaction, it is possible
that either or both of the parties will gain nothing, or that both benefit. We
can incorporate this into the model by introducing an assessment process for
allowing updates to the response dispositions of the agents.
To begin the assessment process, we can first calculate a joint probability
distribution representative of the message sequence that was constructed during
the interaction. Assuming the message sequence consists of k messages labeled
m1,m2, . . . ,mk−1,mk, we find FT , the empirical frequency of message pairs for
interaction sequence T , using
FT (r, s) =
1
k − 1
k∑
i=2
δrmiδ
s
mi−1
(15)
2For long interaction sequences, the response disposition could be updated periodically—
but less frequently than the ego and alter memories—during the sequence.
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for all r and s. Note that Eq. (15) utilizes all of the messages exchanged,
regardless of whether the agent ego and alter memories have infinite memories
(i.e., λ
(A)
A = λ
(E)
A = 1) or undergo “forgetting” (i.e., λ
(A)
A < 1 or λ
(E)
A < 1). This
is due to an assumed period of reflection in which details of the interaction can
be considered at greater length.
To actually make the comparison, we find the distance between the behavior
expressed in the interaction sequence (using FT ) and that expressed by the
response disposition of the agents. A small distance is indicative of relevance
or usefulness of the interaction sequence to the agent, while a great distance
suggests that the interaction sequence is, e.g., purely speculative or impractical.
Focusing on agent A (a similar procedure is followed for agent B), we calcu-
late the distance d
(
FT ,Q
(T )
A
)
using
d2
(
FT ,Q
(T )
A
)
=
1
2
∑
r,s
(
FT (r, s)−Q
(T )
A (r, s)
)2
. (16)
Since FT andQ
(T )
A are both probability distributions, the distance d
(
FT ,Q
(T )
A
)
must lie in the interval [0, 1] The value of the distance must be below an accep-
tance threshold ηA that reflects the absorbative capacity of agent A, limiting
what interaction sequences agent A accepts.
The above considerations are used to define an update rule for the response
disposition. Formally, this is
Q
(T )
A = (1− kA)Q
(T−1)
A + kAF
T−1 , (17)
where the update rate kA is in the interval [0, 1]. The update rule in Eq. (17)
is applied if and only if d
(
FT ,Q
(T )
A
)
< ηA.
5.2 Communities of agents.
In this work, we have focused on interactions between pairs of agents. The
agent definitions are posed in a manner that generalizes readily to larger groups
of agents. However, some extensions to the agents described in section 3.3
are needed, in order to introduce rules by which agents select communication
partners.
A reasonable approach is to base rules for selecting interaction partners on
affinities that the agents have for each other. Letting GXY be the affinity that
agent X has for agent Y , we set the probability that agent X and agent Y
interact to be proportional to GXY GY X (the product is appropriate because
the affinities need not be symmetric). A pair of interacting agents can then be
chosen based on the combined affinities of all the agents present in the system.
As a starting point, the affinities can be assigned predetermined values,
defining a fixed network of agents. More interestingly, the affinities can be
determined based on the agent memories, so that interaction produces a dy-
namically changing network. A natural approach to take is to compare the
behavior of an agent A with its expectation of the behavior of another agent B,
as represented by the alter memory A
(t)
AB. For example, agents can be con-
structed to predominately interact with other agents they assess as similar by
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defining
GXY =
k
k + d
, (18)
where k is a settable parameter and d is the distance defined in Eq. (14). The
affinities can be viewed as the weights in a graph describing the agent network.
The outcomes of interactions will depend not only on agent preferences and
strategies, but also on the patterns of relations—encoded by the affinity graph—
within which the agents are embedded. The structure of the network may play
an important role in influencing the global spread of information or facilitating
collective action. The interplay between network architecture and dynamical
consequences is not straightforward, since the properties of the graphs that are
relevant to individual and collective behavior of the agents will depend on the
nature of the dynamical process describing the interactions. This process can be
related to prior studies of contagion (see, e.g., Blanchard et al. 2005). However,
unlike classical epidemiological models, which assume spread of contagion to be
a memory-free process, agents are affected by both past and present interactions
amongst one another. The probability of “infection” can exhibit threshold-like
behavior, with the probability of adopting some behavioral pattern changing
suddenly after some finite number of exposures.
6 Summary
In this work, we have introduced an agent-based model of interaction. The
model draws on concepts from Luhmann’s contingency approach, and builds
on an earlier model by Dittrich, Kron, and Banzhaf. Agent interactions are
formulated as the exchange of distinct messages that are selected based on
individual agent properties and the interaction history.
We expressed the model mathematically, in a form suitable for handling an
arbitrary number of agents. Agent memories are formulated using a number of
probability distributions. Two types of memories, the ego and alter memories,
are similar to the memories used by Dittrich et al., but we also introduced a
response disposition showing individual preferences for the agents. A selection
probability for messages is calculated from the memories, along with a random-
izing term allowing for invention.
The selection probabilities are used to determine which messages the agents
exchange, but the selection probabilities themselves depend on the ego and alter
memories, which record the messages exchanged. To analyze the properties of
the model, we focused on pairs of agents. Using analytic methods and computa-
tional simulations, we explored the asymptotic properties of the agent memories
and selection probability as the number of messages exchanged becomes very
large, identifying some conditions for the existence and uniqueness of stable
asymptotic solutions. Additionally, we investigated numerically the rates of
change in shorter interaction sequences.
Finally, we sketched out intended extensions of the model. We described how
the response dispositions of the agents might be updated and suggested how
to handle larger groups of agents. In particular, these two extensions appear
sufficient for investigating how inventions can be either adopted or rejected by
the community of agents. Since an agent uses its response disposition with
any of the other agents, the response disposition serves as a sort of general
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behavioral preference, in the form of messages and transitions between messages.
By tracking changes to the response disposition, we can distinguish between
successful and unsuccessful inventions. In networks of agents, this approach
would allow us to investigate how various network structures might facilitate or
hinder the spread of inventions. This will be the subject of future research.
Acknowledgments.
We are grateful to G. Maillard for helpful references and comments on the math-
ematical aspects. In addition we thank T. Kru¨ger and W. Czerny for many use-
ful discussions. We would like to acknowledge support from the Fundac¸a˜o para
a Cieˆncia e a Tecnologia under Bolsa de Investigac¸a˜o SFRH/BPD/9417/2002
(MJB) and Plurianual CCM (MJB, LS), as well as support from FEDER/POCTI,
project 40706/MAT/2001 (LS). Ph. Blanchard, E. Buchinger and B. Cessac
warmly acknowledge the CCM for its hospitality.
A Mathematical analysis.
In this appendix, we develop the mathematical aspects summarized in sec-
tion 4.1. The formalism presented here deals with the two-agent case, but
some aspects generalize to the multi-agent case. We are mainly interested in
the asymptotic behavior of the model, where the interaction between the two
agents is infinitely long. Though this limit is not reached in concrete situations,
it can give us some idea of the system behavior for sufficiently long sequences.
The asymptotic results essentially apply to the finite case, provided that the
length of the sequence is longer than the largest characteristic time for the
transients (given by the spectral gap; see section A.4).
A.1 Basic statements.
Recall that U
(t)
A|B (r | s) is the conditional probability that agent A selects mes-
sage r at time t given that agent B selected s at time t − 1. It is given by
Eq. (7),
U
(t)
A|B (r | s) =
1
N
(t)
A|B
(
c
(A)
1 QA (r | s) + c
(A)
2 E
(t)
A|B (r | s) + c
(A)
3 H
[
A
(t)
A|B (· | r)
]
+
c
(A)
4
nS
)
,
(19)
where H
[
A
(t)
A|B (· | r)
]
is
H
[
A
(t)
A|B (· | r)
]
= −
nS∑
r′=1
A
(t)
A|B (r
′ | r) lognS
(
A
(t)
A|B (r
′ | r)
)
. (20)
Note that this term does not depend on s. The normalization factor N
(t)
A|B is
given by
N
(t)
A|B = 1 + c
(A)
3
(
nS∑
r=1
H
[
A
(t)
A|B (· | r)
]
− 1
)
(21)
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and does not depend on time when c
(A)
3 = 0. Moreover,
1− c
(A)
3 ≤ N
(t)
A|B ≤ 1 + c
(A)
3 (nS − 1) . (22)
It will be useful in the following to write U
(t)
A|B (r | s) in matrix form, so that
U
(t)
A|B =
1
N
(t)
A|B
(
c
(A)
1 QA + c
(A)
2 E
(t)
A|B + c
(A)
3 H
[
A
(t)
A|B
]
+ c
(A)
4 S
)
, (23)
with a corresponding equation for the U
(t)
B|A. The matrix S is the uniform
conditional probability, with the form
S =
1
nS


1 · · · 1
...
. . .
...
1 · · · 1

 . (24)
We use the notation H
[
A
(t)
A|B
]
for the matrix with the r, s element given by
H
[
A
(t)
A|B (· | r)
]
.
For simplicity, we assume here that agent B always starts the interaction.
This means that agent B selects the message at odd times t and agent A selects
at even times. When it does not harm the clarity of the expressions, we will drop
the subscripts labeling the agents from the transition probabilities and call U(t)
the transition matrix at time t, with the convention that U(2n) ≡ U
(2n)
A|B and
U(2n+1) ≡ U
(2n+1)
B|A . Where possible, we will further simplify the presentation by
focusing on just one of the agents, with the argument for the other determined
by a straightforward exchange of the roles of the agents.
A.2 Dynamics.
Call P(t) (r) the probability that the relevant agent selects message r at time
t. The evolution of P(t) (r) is determined by a one parameter family of (time
dependent) transition matrices, like in Markov chains. However, the evolution
is not Markovian since the transition matrices depend on the entire past history
(see section A.3).
Denote by m˜ = m1,m2, . . . ,mt−1,mt, . . . an infinite message exchange se-
quence where mt is the t-th exchanged symbol. The probability that the finite
subsequence m1,m2, . . . ,mt−1,mt has been selected is given by
Prob [mt,mt−1, . . . ,m2,m1] =
U (t) (mt | mt−1)U
(t−1) (mt−1 | mt−2) . . .U
(2) (m2 | m1)P
(1) (m1) .(25)
Thus,
P(t) = U(t)U(t−1)U(t−2) · · ·U(2)P(1) . (26)
Since agent B selects the initial message, we have P(1) (r) =
∑nS
s=1QB (r, s). As
well, the joint probability of the sequential messages mt and mt−1 is
Prob [mt,mt−1] = U
(t)(mt | mt−1)P
(t−1) (mt−1) . (27)
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Note that theU(t) depend on the response dispositions. Therefore one can at
most expect statistical statements referring to some probability measure on the
space of response disposition matrices (recall that the selection probability for
the first message is also determined by the response disposition). We therefore
need to consider statistical averages to characterize the typical behavior of the
model for fixed values of the coefficients c
(A)
i and c
(B)
i .
A.3 Existence and uniqueness of a stationary state.
In this section, we briefly discuss the asymptotic properties of the ME model
considered as a stochastic process. The main objective is to show the existence
and uniqueness of a stationary state, given that the probability for a given
message to be selected at time t depends on the entire past (via the ego and
alter memories). In the case where c2 = c3 = 0, the ME model is basically a
Markov process and it can be handled with the standard results in the field.
In the general case, one has first to construct the probability on the set of
infinite trajectories AIN where A = {1, 2, . . . nS} is the set of messages. The
corresponding sigma algebra F is constructed as usual with the cylinder sets.
In the ME model the transition probabilities corresponding to a given agent
are determined via the knowledge of the sequence of message pairs (second or-
der approach), but the following construction holds for an n-th order approach,
n ≥ 1, where the transition probabilities depends on a sequence of n-tuples.
If m1,m2, . . . ,mt−1,mt is a message sequence, we denote by ω1, ω2, . . . ωk the
sequence of pairs ω1 = (m1,m2), ω2 = (m3,m4), . . . ωk = (m2k−1,m2k). De-
note by ωml = (ωl . . . ωm), where m > l. We construct a family of conditional
probabilities given by
P
[
ωt = (r, s)|ω
t−1
1
]
= c1Q(r, s)+c2E
[
ωt = (r, s)|ω
t−1
1
]
+c3H
(
A
[
· | ωt−11
])
(r)+c4
(28)
for t > 1, where
E
[
ωt = (r, s)|ω
t−1
1
]
=
1
t
t−1∑
k=1
χ(ωk = (r, s)) , (29)
with χ() being the indicatrix function (A
[
· | ωt−11
]
has the same form, see sec-
tion 3.3.1). For t = 1 the initial pair ω1 is drawn using the response disposition
as described in the text. Call the corresponding initial probability µ.
We have
P
[
ωmn+1|ω
n
1
]
= P [ωn+1|ω
n
1 ]P
[
ωn+2|ω
n+1
1
]
. . . P
[
ωm|ω
m−1
1
]
(30)
and, ∀m, l > 1,∑
ω
m−1
1
P
[
ωm−11 |ω1
]
P
[
ωm+lm |ω
m−1
1
]
= P
[
ωm+lm |ω1
]
. (31)
From this relation, we can define a probability on the cylinders
{
ωm+lm
}
by
P
[
ωm+lm
]
=
∑
ω1
P
[
ωm+lm |ω1
]
µ(ω1) . (32)
23
This measure extends then on the space of trajectories
(
AIN,F
)
by Kolmogorov’s
theorem. It depends on the probability µ of choice for the first symbol (hence it
depends on the response disposition of the starting agent). A stationary state
is then a shift invariant measure on the set of infinite sequences. We have not
yet been able to find rigorous conditions ensuring the existence of a stationary
state, but some arguments are given below. In the following, we assume this
existence.
Uniqueness is expected from standard ergodic argument whenever all tran-
sitions are permitted. This is the case when both c4 > 0 and c3 ≥ 0 (the case
where c3 is negative is trickier and is discussed below). When the invariant state
is unique, it is ergodic and in this case the empirical frequencies corresponding
to alter and ego memories converge (almost surely) to a limit corresponding
to the marginal probability P [ω] obtained from Eq. (32). Thus, the transition
matrices U(t) also converge to a limit.
In our model, uniqueness basically implies that the asymptotic behavior of
the agent does not depend on the past. This convergence can be interpreted as
a stabilization of the behavior of each agent when interacting with the other.
After a sufficiently long exchange of messages, each agent has a representation
of the other that does not evolve in time (alter memory). It may evaluate the
probability of all possible reactions to the possible stimuli, and this probability
is not modified by further exchanges. Its own behavior, and the corresponding
representation (ego memory), is similarly fixed.
In the next section we derive explicit solutions for the asymptotic alter and
ego memories. We are able to identify several regions in the parameters space
where the solution is unique. But it is not excluded that several solutions exist
in other regions, especially for c3 < 0. In this case, the long time behavior of
the agent depends on the initial conditions. A thorough investigation of this
point is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
Note that the kind of processes encountered in the ME model has interesting
relations with the so-called “chains with complete connections” (see Maillard
2003) for a comprehensive introduction and detailed bibliography). There is in
particular an interesting relation between chains with complete connections and
the Dobrushin-Landford-Ruelle construction of Gibbs measures (Maillard 2003).
Note, however, that the transition probabilities in our model do not obey the
continuity property usual in the context of chains with complete connections.
A.4 Transients and asymptotics.
The time evolution and the asymptotic properties of Eq. (26) are determined
by the spectral properties of the matrix product U(t)U(t−1)U(t−2) . . .U(2). As-
sume that the U(t) converge to a limit. Then, since the U(t) are conditional
probabilities, there exists, by the Perron-Frobenius theorem, an eigenvector as-
sociated with an eigenvalue 1, corresponding to a stationary state (the states
may be different for odd and even times). The stationary state is not necessarily
unique. It is unique if there exist a time t0 such that for all t > t0 the matrices
U(t) are recurrent and aperiodic (ergodic). For c3 > 0 and c4 > 0, ergodicity
is assured by the presence of the matrix S, which allows transitions from any
message to any other message. This means that for positive c3 the asymptotic
behavior of the agents does not depend on the history (but the transients depend
on it, and they can be very long).
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For c3 < 0, it is possible that some transitions allowed by the matrix S are
canceled and that the transition matrix U(t) loses the recurrence property for
sufficiently large t. In such a case, it is not even guaranteed that a stationary
regime exists.
The convergence rate of the process is determined by the spectrum of the
U(t) and especially by the spectral gap (distance between the largest eigenvalue
of one and the second largest eigenvalue). Consequently, studying the statistical
properties of the evolution for the spectrum of the U(t) provides information
such as the rate at which agent A has stabilized its behavior when interacting
with agent B.
The uncertainty term and the noise term play particular roles in the evolu-
tion determined by Eq. (23). First, the matrix S entering in the noise term has
eigenvalue 0 with multiplicity nS − 1 and eigenvalue 1 with multiplicity 1. The
eigenvector corresponding to the latter eigenvalue is
u =
1
nS


1
1
...
1

 , (33)
which is the uniform probability vector, corresponding to maximal entropy.
Consequently, S is a projector onto u.
Second, the uncertainty term does not depend on the stimulus s. It cor-
responds therefore to a matrix where all the entries in a row are equal. More
precisely, set α
(t)
r = H
[
A
(t)
A|B (· | r)
]
. Then one can write the corresponding
matrix in the form nSv
(t)uT, where v(t) is the vector
v(t) =


α
(t)
1
α
(t)
2
...
α
(t)
nS

 (34)
and uT is the transpose of u. It follows that the uncertainty term has a 0
eigenvalue with multiplicity n− 1 and an eigenvalue
∑nS
r=1H
[
A
(t)
A|B (· | r)
]
with
corresponding eigenvector v(t). It is also apparent that, for any probability
vector P, we have H
[
A
(t)
A|B
]
P = nSv
(t)
A u
TP = v
(t)
A .
The action of U(t) on P(t) is then given by
P
(t+1)
A = U
(t)
A|BP
(t)
B
=
1
N (t)
([
c
(A)
1 QA + c
(A)
2 E
(t)
A|B
]
P
(t)
B + c
(A)
3 v
(t)
A + c
(A)
4 u
)
. (35)
The expression in Eq. (35) warrants several remarks. Recall that all the vectors
above have positive entries. Therefore the noise term c
(A)
4 u tends to “push” P
(t)
B
in the direction of the vector of maximal entropy, with the effect of increasing
the entropy whatever the initial probability and the value of the coefficients.
The uncertainty term c
(A)
3 v
(t)
A plays a somewhat similar role in the sense that it
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also has its image on a particular vector. However, this vector is not static, in-
stead depending on the evolution via the alter memory. Further, the coefficient
c
(A)
3 may have either a positive or a negative value. A positive c
(A)
3 increases
the contribution of v
(t)
A but a negative c
(A)
3 decreases the contribution. Conse-
quently, we expect drastic changes in the model evolution when we change the
sign of c
(A)
3 —see section 4.2 and especially Fig. 6 for a striking demonstration
of these changes.
A.5 Equations of the stationary state.
The influence of the coefficients c
(A)
i and c
(B)
i is easier to handle when an asymp-
totic state, not necessarily unique and possibly sample dependent, is reached. In
this case, we must still distinguish between odd times (agent B active) and even
times (agent A active), that is, P(t) has two accumulation points depending on
whether t is odd or even. Call P
(∞)
A (m) the probability that, in the stationary
regime, agent A selects the message m during interaction with agent B. In the
same way, call P
(∞)
AB (r, s) the asymptotic joint probability that agent A responds
with message r to a stimulus message s from agent B. Note that, in general,
P
(∞)
AB (r, s) 6= P
(∞)
BA (r, s), but P
(∞)
A (m) =
∑
s P
(∞)
AB (m, s) =
∑
r P
(∞)
BA (r,m) and
P
(∞)
B (m) =
∑
s P
(∞)
BA (m, s) =
∑
r P
(∞)
AB (r,m) since each message simultaneous
is both a stimulus and a response.
Since alter and ego memories are empirical frequencies of stimulus-response
pairs, the convergence to a stationary state implies that E
(2n)
AB (r, s) converges
to a limit E
(∞)
AB (r, s) which is precisely the asymptotic probability of stimulus-
response pairs. Therefore, we have
E
(∞)
AB (r, s) = P
(∞)
AB (r, s) (36)
E
(∞)
BA (r, s) = P
(∞)
BA (r, s) . (37)
Thus, the U
(2n)
A|B converge to a limit U
(∞)
A|B, where
U
(∞)
A|B =
1
N
(∞)
A|B
(
c
(A)
1 QA + c
(A)
2 E
(∞)
A|B + c
(A)
3 H
[
A
(∞)
A|B
]
+ c
(A)
4 S
)
. (38)
From Eq. (27), we have P
(∞)
A (r) =
∑
s U
(∞)
A|B (r | s)P
(∞)
B (s). Hence,
P
(∞)
A = U
(∞)
A|BP
(∞)
B (39)
P
(∞)
B = U
(∞)
B|AP
(∞)
A (40)
and
P
(∞)
A = U
(∞)
A|BU
(∞)
B|AP
(∞)
A (41)
P
(∞)
B = U
(∞)
B|AU
(∞)
A|BP
(∞)
B . (42)
It follows that the asymptotic probability P
(∞)
A is an eigenvector of U
(∞)
A|BU
(∞)
B|A
corresponding to the eigenvalue 1. We will call this eigenvector the first mode
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of the corresponding matrix. Therefore, the marginal ego memory of agent A
converges to the first mode of U
(∞)
A|BU
(∞)
B|A. A numerical example is provided in
section 4.2.2.
Combining Eqs. (27) and (36), P
(∞)
AB (r, s) = U
(∞)
A|B (r | s)P
(∞)
B (s) = E
(∞)
AB (r, s).
But P
(∞)
B (s) =
∑
r P
(∞)
AB (r, s) =
∑
r E
(∞)
AB (r, s), so
E
(∞)
A|B (r | s) = U
(∞)
A|B (r | s) (43)
E
(∞)
B|A (r | s) = U
(∞)
B|A (r | s) . (44)
Therefore, using the relation E
(∞)
A|B (r | s) = A
(∞)
B|A (r | s), we have
E
(∞)
A|B (r | s) =
1
N
(∞)
A|B
[
c
(A)
1 QA (r | s) + c
(A)
2 E
(∞)
A|B (r | s) + c
(A)
3 H
[
E
(∞)
B|A (· | r)
]
+ c
(A)
4
]
(45)
E
(∞)
B|A (r | s) =
1
N
(∞)
B|A
[
c
(B)
1 QB (r | s) + c
(B)
2 E
(∞)
B|A (r | s) + c
(B)
3 H
[
E
(∞)
A|B (· | r)
]
+ c
(B)
4
]
.
(46)
A.6 Solutions of the stationary equations.
Define
β
(A)
i =
c
(A)
i
N
(∞)
i|A − c
(A)
2
. (47)
With this definition, Eqs. (45) and (46) become:
E
(∞)
A|B (r | s) = β
(A)
1 QA (r | s) + β
(A)
3 H
[
E
(∞)
B|A (· | r)
]
+ β
(A)
4 (48)
E
(∞)
B|A (r | s) = β
(B)
1 QB (r | s) + β
(B)
3 H
[
E
(∞)
A|B (· | r)
]
+ β
(B)
4 . (49)
We next plug Eq. (49) into Eq. (48). After some manipulation, we obtain
E
(∞)
A|B (r | s) =
β
(A)
1 QA (r | s) + β
(A)
4 + β
(A)
3 H
[
β
(B)
1 QB (· | r) + β
(B)
4
]
− β
(A)
3
∑
r′
(β
(B)
1 QB (r
′ | r) + β
(B)
4 ) lognS

1 + β
(B)
3 H
[
E
(∞)
A|B (· | r
′)
]
β
(B)
1 QB (r
′ | r) + β
(B)
4


− β
(A)
3 β
(B)
3
∑
r′
lognS
(
β
(B)
1 QB (r
′ | r) + β
(B)
4
)
H
[
E
(∞)
A|B (· | r
′)
]
− β
(A)
3 β
(B)
3
∑
r′
H
[
E
(∞)
A|B (· | r
′)
]
lognS

1 + β
(B)
3 H
[
E
(∞)
A|B (· | r
′)
]
β
(B)
1 QB (r
′ | r) + β
(B)
4


, (50)
which uncouples the expression for E
(∞)
A|B (r | s) from that for E
(∞)
B|A (r | s). In
some sense, Eq. (50) provides a solution of the model with two agents, since it
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captures the asymptotic behavior of the ego and alter memories (provided the
stationary regime exists). However, the solution to Eq. (50) is difficult to obtain
for the general case and depends on all the parameters c
(A)
i and c
(B)
i . Below,
we discuss a few specific situations.
This form has the advantage that it accommodates series expansion in c
(A)
3 .
However, β
(A)
3 depends on E
(∞)
A|B via the normalization factor from Eq. (21) and
high order terms in the expansion are tricky to obtain. Despite this, the bounds
given in Eq. (22) ensure that β
(A)
3 is small whenever c
(A)
3 is small. This allows
us to characterize the behavior of the model when c
(A)
3 changes its sign. This is
of principle importance, since we shall see that a transition occurs near c3 = 0.
It is clear that the first term in Eq. (50) is of order zero in β
(A)
3 , the second term
is of order one, and the remaining terms are of higher order.
When c
(A)
3 = 0, agent A does not use its alter memory in response selection.
Its asymptotic ego memory is a simple function of its response disposition, with
the form
E
(∞)
A|B (r | s) = β
(A)
1 QA (r | s) + β
(A)
4 . (51)
When c
(A)
3 is small, E
(∞)
A|B (r | s) becomes a nonlinear function of the conditional
response disposition for agent B, so that
E
(∞)
A|B (r | s) = β
(A)
1 QA (r | s) + β
(A)
4 + β
(A)
3 H
[
β
(B)
1 QB (· | r) + β
(B)
4
]
(52)
An explicit, unique solution exists in this case.
For small values of c
(A)
3 , the derivative of E
(∞)
A|B (r | s) with respect to c
(A)
3
is proportional to H
[
β
(B)
1 QB (· | r) + β
(B)
4
]
. Note that the derivative depends
nonlinearly on the coefficients c
(B)
1 and c
(B)
4 , and that, therefore, the level lines
H
[
β
(B)
1 QB (· | r) + β
(B)
4
]
= C depend on c
(B)
1 and c
(B)
4 (see Fig. 6 where the
levels lines are drawn—they do not coincide with c3 = 0). This slope can be
steep if the uncertainty in agent B’s response disposition is high. For example,
if c
(B)
1 is small, the entropy is high. There exists therefore a transition, possibly
sharp, near c
(A)
3 = 0.
As β
(A)
3 further increases, we must deal with a more complex, nonlinear
equation for the ego memory. In the general case, several solutions may exist.
A simple case corresponds to having c
(A)
3 = c
(B)
3 = 1. Indeed, in this case,
we have
E
(∞)
A|B (r | s) = −β
(A)
3 β
(B)
3
∑
r′
H
[
E
(∞)
A|B (· | r
′)
]
lognS

1 + β
(B)
3 H
[
E
(∞)
A|B (· | r
′)
]
β
(B)
1 QB (r
′ | r) + β
(B)
4


(53)
The right hand side is therefore independent of r and s. It is thus constant and
corresponds to a uniform E
(∞)
A|B (r | s). Hence, using Eq. (43), the asymptotic
selection probability is also uniform and the asymptotic marginal probability
of messages P
(∞)
A (r) is the uniform probability distribution, as described in
section A.5. Consistent with the choice of the coefficients, P
(∞)
A (r) has maximal
entropy.
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Next, note that if c
(A)
2 is large (but strictly lower than one), convergence to
the stationary state is mainly dominated by the ego memory. However, since
the ego memory is based on actual message selections, the early steps of the
interaction, when few messages have been exchanged and many of the E
(t)
AB (r, s)
are zero, are driven by the response disposition and by the noise term. However,
as soon as the stimulus-response pair (r, s) has occurred once, the transition
probability U
(t)
A|B (r | s) will be dominated by the ego term U
(t)
A|B (r | s) and the
agent will tend to reproduce the previous answer. The noise term allows the
system to escape periodic cycles generated by the ego memory, but the time
required to reach the asymptotic state can be very long. In practical terms,
this means that when c4 is small and c2 is large for each of the two agents, the
interaction will correspond to metastability, with limit cycles occurring on long
times. Also, though there exists a unique asymptotic state as soon as c4 > 0,
there may exist a large number of distinct metastable state. Thus, when c2
is large for both agents, we expect an effective (that is on the time scale of a
typical interaction) ergodicity breaking with a wide variety of metastable states.
To summarize, the roles of the various coefficients in Eq. (19) are:
• c1 emphasizes the role of the response disposition. When c1 is nearly one
for both agents, the asymptotic behavior is determined by the spectral
properties of the product of the conditional response disposition.
• c2 enhances the tendency of an agent to reproduce its previous responses.
It has a strong influence on the transients and when c2 is large, many
metastable states may be present.
• c3 drives the agent to either pursue or avoid uncertainty. A positive c3
favors the increase of entropy, while a negative c3 penalizes responses
increasing the entropy.
• c4 is a noise term ensuring ergodicity, even though the characteristic time
needed to reach stationarity (measured using, e.g., the spectral gap in the
asymptotic selection probability matrices) can be very long.
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Figure 1: Block-structured response dispositions. The size of the circle is pro-
portional to the value of the corresponding entry.
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Figure 2: Evolution of the distance between the vector E
(t)
A (r) and the first
mode of U
(∞)
A|BU
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B|A as the number of interaction sequences increases.
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Figure 3: Evolution of the joint entropy of alter and ego memory with infinite
(λ(A) = λ(E) = 1) and finite (λ(A) = λ(E) = 0.99) memories.
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Alter
c1=0.99; c2=0; c3=0; c4=0.01
Ego
c1=0.99; c2=0; c3=0; c4=0.01
c1=0; c2=0.99; c3=0; c4=0.01 c1=0; c2=0.99; c3=0; c4=0.01
c1=0; c2=0; c3=0.99; c4=0.01 c1=0; c2=0; c3=0.99; c4=0.01
c1=0.99; c2=0.99; c3=-0.99; c4=0.01 c1=0.99; c2=0.99; c3=-0.99; c4=0.01
Figure 4: Average asymptotic memories for agent A after 128000 steps, with
infinite memories. The matrices shown here are calculated by averaging over
10 initial conditions. The sizes of the red circles are proportional to the corre-
sponding matrix elements, while the sizes of the blue squares are proportional
to the mean square deviations.
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Alter
c1=0.99; c2=0; c3=0; c4=0.01
Ego
c1=0.99; c2=0; c3=0; c4=0.01
c1=0; c2=0.99; c3=0; c4=0.01 c1=0; c2=0.99; c3=0; c4=0.01
c1=0; c2=0; c3=0.99; c4=0.01 c1=0; c2=0; c3=0.99; c4=0.01
c1=0.99; c2=0.99; c3=-0.99; c4=0.01 c1=0.99; c2=0.99; c3=-0.99; c4=0.01
Figure 5: Average asymptotic memories for agent A after 128000 steps, with
finite memories (λ(A) = λ(E) = 0.99). The matrices shown here are calculated by
averaging over 10 initial conditions. The sizes of the red circles are proportional
to the corresponding matrix elements, while the sizes of the blue squares are
proportional to the mean square deviations.
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(a) Infinite memory (λ(A) = λ(E) = 1).
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(b) Finite memory (λ(A) = λ(E) = 0.99).
Figure 6: Asymptotic joint entropy for alter memory of agent A, with (a) infinite
memories and (b) finite memories. The plane represents c3 = 0. The colored
lines in the c1-c2 plane are level lines for the joint entropy, while the black line
shows where the c3 = 0 plane intersects the c1-c2 plane.
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Figure 7: Banded response disposition. The size of the circle is proportional to
the value of the corresponding entry.
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Figure 8: Rates of change for the alter memory of the student agent approaching
the response disposition of the teacher agent. The colored lines in the c1-c2 plane
are level lines for the rates.
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